The Right Approach to Harmless Error

My article “Harmless Errors and Substantial Rights” challenged conventional wisdom about the harmless constitutional error doctrine in criminal procedure. Specifically, I contended that the traditional way of understanding harmless error as a remedial doctrine rooted in so-called “constitutional common law” created significant anomalies. Instead, harmless constitutional error doctrine can only be understood as part of the definition and judicial enforcement of constitutional rights.Few legal scholars have thought as deeply about the mysteries of harmless error as Professor John M. Greabe, and he is well equipped to give the remedial perspective the best possible defense. Nonetheless, despite Professor Greabe’s able efforts in his response piece “Criminal Procedure Rights and Harmless Error: A Response to Professor Epps,” I remain persuaded of the correctness of the rights-based approach to harmless error laid out in my article.In this short Reply, I explain why. First, I respond to Professor Greabe’s most significant criticisms of my rights-based approach, and show why I think they miss the mark. Second, I explain why Professor Greabe’s own remedy-based theory is itself problematic and unable to solve the enduring riddles of harmless error

Perfecting Issue Preservation

In his article, “Does It Matter Who Objects? Rethinking the Burden to Prevent Errors in Criminal Process,” Darryl Brown challenges the venerable rule that a defendant must preserve objections to erroneous rulings at trial in order to perfect them for later appeal. Brown ably convinced me that conventional wisdom about who should bear the burden of bringing errors to a court’s attention is woefully under-theorized. In particular, Brown’s move to analyze adjudicative error from the perspective of accident prevention in other legal contexts is both clever and generative of insights. Moreover, Brown made a persuasive case that normative judgments about fairness, rather than a careful cost–benefit analysis, may better explain the status quo. What I am less certain of, though, is whether Brown has met his burden of persuading us that we should adopt his proposed rule: that the law should place the duty to avoid errors on the party that benefits from the error.In this short Response, I explain why I am not fully persuaded. In Part I, I discuss why Brown’s rule may not necessarily prevent errors as much as he hopes, and may instead significantly increase reversals and retrials. In Part II, I question whether that cost is worth bearing, by interrogating the concept of “error” and its multiple possible meanings. That inquiry leads me to a limited defense of our system’s current approach to forfeited legal errors. I conclude by suggesting more modest reforms that, in my view, follow from Brown’s significant insights

Nonpartisan Supreme Court Reform and the Biden Commission

Prior to his election to the Presidency, Joe Biden promised to create a bipartisan commission that would consider and evaluate reforms to the Supreme Court of the United States. Shortly after his inauguration, he did just that, announcing a thirty-six-member Commission on the Supreme Court. Made up of distinguished scholars and lawyers, the Commission was charged with drafting a report that would describe and analyze historical and current debates about reforming the Court. The eventual report seemed to make few observers happy. It reached few firm conclusions on the legality of any reform proposals and even fewer conclusions on any reform’s merits.It was hard to imagine that any commission could deliver recommendations that would persuade political actors of both parties of the need for major reforms. But was the idea behind the Biden Commission wrong-headed? That is, is the very notion of nonpartisan Supreme Court reform mistaken? This Essay tries to answer this question. Building on my testimony before the Commission, I try to develop a plausible nonpartisan argument for reforming the Supreme Court: an argument why one could conclude that the current structure of the Court is flawed and needs to be changed, without regard to the current partisan balance of power on the Court. I briefly categorize and describe possible responses to that problem. I then discuss the Commission’s efforts—and failures—to build bipartisan support for Supreme Court reform. Finally, I use the Commission as a springboard for discussing the difficult obstacles for nonpartisan structural reform of the Court in our polarized system

The Lottery Docket

We propose supplementing the Supreme Court’s caseload with a “lottery docket” of cases selected at random from final judgments of the circuit courts. The Court currently possesses almost unfettered authority to set its own agenda through its certiorari jurisdiction. By rule and custom, the Court exercises that discretion by selecting cases that it sees as important, in a narrow sense of that term. The Court’s free hand in agenda setting has obvious benefits, but it has drawbacks as well. It deprives the Court of critical information about how the law operates in ordinary cases. It signals to circuit courts that their decisions are unreviewable—and thus unaccountable—in unimportant cases. And it passes over many cases that are important in a less narrow sense. The Court uses the existence of a circuit split to identify cases as important, but splits are merely proxies for, not measures of, importance. While many issues selected through the certiorari process are important, not all important issues are selected by certiorari. More fundamentally, we question the premise that only “important” cases deserve the Court’s attention. The legal system would be improved if every Term, the Supreme Court were forced to decide some unquestionably unimportant cases—run-of-the-mill appeals dealing with the kinds of legal questions that the lower courts resolve every day. Over the long run, a lottery docket would offset the pathologies of the certiorari system without depriving the Court of its ability to resolve questions that have divided the lower courts

The Defender General

The United States needs a Defender General—a public official charged with representing the collective interests of criminal defendants before the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court is effectively our nation’s chief regulator of criminal justice. But in the battle to influence the Court’s rulemaking, government interests have substantial structural advantages. As compared to counsel for defendants, government lawyers—and particularly those from the U.S. Solicitor General’s office—tend to be more experienced advocates who have more credibility with the Court. Most importantly, government lawyers can act strategically to play for bigger long-term victories, while defense lawyers must zealously advocate for the interests of their clients—even when they conflict with the interests of criminal defendants as a whole. The prosecution’s advantages likely distort the law on the margins.If designed carefully, staffed with the right personnel, and given time to develop institutional credibility, a new Office of the Defender General could level the playing field, making the Court a more effective regulator of criminal justice. In some cases—where the interests of a particular defendant and those of defendants as a class align—the Defender General would appear as counsel for a defendant. In cases where the defendant’s interests diverge from the collective interests of defendants, the Defender General might urge the Court not to grant certiorari, or it might even argue against the defendant’s position on the merits. In all cases, the Defender General would take the broad view, strategically seeking to move the doctrine in defendant-friendly directions and counteracting the government’s structural advantages

The Informed Jury

The right to a criminal jury trial is a constitutional disappointment. Cases almost never make it to a jury because of plea bargaining. In the few cases that do, the jury is relegated to a narrow factfinding role that denies it normative voice or the ability to serve as a meaningful check on excessive punishment.One simple change could situate the jury where it belongs, at the center of the criminal process. The most important thing juries do in criminal cases is authorize state punishment. But today, when a jury returns a guilty verdict, it authorizes punishment without any idea of what is in store for the defendant. This principle of jury ignorance is a profound mistake. It is unmoored from history and the core function of the jury to authorize punishment. Worse, it exacerbates the criminal legal system’s predilection for excessive severity.This Article offers and defends a proposal to replace ignorant juries with informed ones, by requiring juries to be told of the statutory minimum and maximum punishment in every case before being asked to return a conviction. Informed juries would change the dynamics of criminal justice for the better. In individual cases, punishment information would make juries more careful before convicting and would sometimes lead juries to refuse to convict where punishment would be excessive and unjust. But more importantly, informed juries would provide systemic benefits. Requiring informed juries would set in motion a political feedback loop that would counteract existing incentives for legislators and prosecutors to prefer severity. In addition to being good policy, there are powerful arguments that informed juries deserve to be recognized as part of the constitutional jury-trial right

How to Save the Supreme Court

The consequences of Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s Supreme Court confirmation are seismic. Justice Kavanaugh, replacing Justice Anthony Kennedy, completes a new conservative majority and represents a stunning Republican victory after decades of increasingly partisan battles over control of the Court. The result is a Supreme Court whose Justices are likely to vote along party lines more consistently than ever before in American history. That development gravely threatens the Court’s legitimacy. If in the future roughly half of Americans lack confidence in the Supreme Court’s ability to render impartial justice, the Court’s power to settle important questions of law will be in serious jeopardy. Moreover, many Democrats are already calling for changes like court-packing to prevent the new conservative majority from blocking progressive reforms. Even if justified, such moves could provoke further escalation that would leave the Court’s image and the rule of law badly damaged. The coming crisis can be stopped. But saving the Court’s legitimacy as an institution above politics will require a radical rethinking of how the Court has operated for more than two centuries. In this Feature, we outline a new framework for Supreme Court reform. Specifically, we argue for reforms that are plausibly constitutional (and thus implementable by statute) and that are capable of creating a stable equilibrium even if initially implemented using “hardball” tactics. Under this framework, we evaluate existing proposals and offer two of our own: the Supreme Court Lottery and the Balanced Bench. Whether policymakers adopt these precise proposals or not, our framework can guide their much-needed search for reform. We can save what is good about the Court—but only if we are willing to transform the Court